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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LYNDA SMITH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
RICHARD RAYMOND SMITH, SR. , 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 930162-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to decide this appeal is conferred on the Utah 
Court of Appeals by Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err when it found that the home at 
1098 South Fir Street, Cedar City, Utah, titled in Defendant's 
name, was a marital asset, where the down payment for purchase of 
the home was made with the proceeds of the sale of the Defendant's 
premarital home and the mortgage payments had been paid with 
Defendant's segregated premarital retirement benefits, in the 
absence of evidence that the Plaintiff had, by her efforts, 
augmented, maintained, or protected that property, except to reside 
there? 
The standard for review of a trial court's factual findings is 
the "clearly erroneous" standard. Haqan v. Hagan/ 810 P.2d 478, 
481 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991). 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it ordered 
that the home at 1098 South Fir Street in Cedar City, Utah, be sold 
and the proceeds divided equally between the parties, and granted 
Plaintiff possession of the home pending sale, in light of the 
Defendant having paid the down payment and the monthly mortgage 
payments to purchase the home with his separate funds? 
The applicable standard of appellate review for resolution of 
this issue is the "clear abuse of discretion" standard as cited in 
Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1382, (Utah 1980). 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it ordered 
that the 1988 Jaguar automobile be sold and the proceeds divided 
equally between the parties despite the Defendant's claim to a 
premarital interest in that automobile? 
As to the Court's factual finding concerning the Defendant's 
claim to a pre-marital interest in the 1988 Jaguar automobile, the 
"clearly erroneous" standard for review of the trial court's 
factual findings would apply. Haqan v. Haqan, 810 P.2d 478, 481 
(Ut. Ct. App. 1991). As to the Court's decision regarding 
disposition of that asset, the "clear abuse of discretion" standard 
of review would apply, as set forth in Kerr v. Kerr, 610, P.2d 
1380, 1382, (Utah, 1980). 
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it refused 
to include a portion of the value of the Plaintiff's Porsche 
automobile in the marital estate where the automobile had been 
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substantially repaired and refurbished during the marriage, thereby 
significantly enhancing its value? 
As to the Court's factual finding concerning the Defendant's 
claim to a marital interest in the Porsche automobile, the "clearly 
erroneous" standard for review of the Trial Court's factual 
findings would apply. Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 478, 481 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 1991). As to the Court's decision regarding disposition of 
that asset, the "clear abuse of discretion" standard of review 
would apply as set forth in Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Ut. 
1980) . 
5. Should the Defendant's 401K and salaried savings plan have 
been valued as of the date of trial or, alternatively, as of the 
date of the parties' separation where the Defendant's earnings, 
from which post separation contributions to the plan were made, 
were all from employment in the state of California and the State 
of California has provided by statute that post separation earnings 
are the separate property of the party who earns the income? 
Since this issue involves a question of law, the standard of 
appellate review is a "correction of error" standard, giving no 
deference to the trial court. Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403 
(Ut. Ct. App. 1990) . 
6. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it ordered 
that the Blazer automobile be sold and the proceeds divided equally 
between the parties although the value of the Blazer automobile at 
the time of trial was substantially less than the value at the time 
of separation as a result of damage to the vehicle and repairs 
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required because Plaintiff's son had used or abused the vehicle 
during the parties' separation? 
The applicable standard of appellate review for resolution of 
this issue is the "clear abuse of discretion" standard as cited in 
Kerrey. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1382, (Utah 1980) 
7. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it failed to 
order the Plaintiff to repay to the marital estate money she had 
withdrawn from the parties' joint business in violation of a Court 
order prohibiting her from doing so? 
The applicable standard of appellate review for resolution of 
this issue is the "clear abuse of discretion" standard as cited in 
Kerr v. Kerr, 610, P.2d 1380, 1382, (Ut. 1980). 
8. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it refused 
to order the Plaintiff to compensate Defendant for damage to his 
fire arms caused by her son while the property was left in her 
possession during the pendency of the proceedings? 
The applicable standard of appellate review for resolution of 
this issue is the "clear abuse of discretion" standard as cited in 
Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1381, (Ut. 1980). 
9. Should the trial court have included, as an asset of the 
marriage which should be awarded to the Plaintiff, a child support 
receivable which the Plaintiff had accumulated during the parties' 
marriage where the Defendant provided nearly all of the support for 
Plaintiff's child during the parties' marriage? 
Since this issue involves a question of law, the standard of 
appellate review is a "correction of error" standard, giving no 
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deference to the trial court. Maxwell v. Maxwell/ 796 P.2d 403 
(Ut. Ct. App. 1990) . 
11. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it refused 
to order that the credit card debt incurred for the Defendant's 
travel expenses prior to the parties' separation, which had 
historically been considered a debt of the parties' joint business, 
be paid from income generated by the business or with the proceeds 
of sale of that business? 
The applicable standard of appellate review for resolution of 
this issue is the "clear abuse of discretion" standard as cited in 
Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1382, (Ut. 1980). 
12. Is the trial court's finding the Defendant was in 
contempt for failure to pay one-half of a tax refund to the 
Plaintiff supported by the evidence where Defendant withheld paying 
the money directly to Plaintiff because he was waiting for a ruling 
from the Court on his claim that the credit card debt for travel 
expenses should be paid as a business debt and the Court had 
earlier issued an order that the tax refund be used to pay business 
debts? 
As to the Court's factual findings with reference to this 
issue, the "clearly erroneous" standard of review would apply. 
Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 478, 481 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
California Civil Code §5118. 
The earnings and accumulations of a spouse and minor 
children living with, or in the custody of, the spouse, 
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while living separate and apart from the other spouse, 
are the separate property of the spouse. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case. 
This case is before the Court on appeal from a Decree of 
Divorce and Orders entered following a hearing on motions filed 
pursuant to Rule 52(b) and Rule 59 of Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The Complaint for Divorce was filed on or about May 5, 1992. 
(Record at 2) At a hearing held on May 21, 1992, certain orders 
were rendered by the Domestic Court Commissioner. (Record at 42) 
Motions were filed by each party since that time to modify or 
enforce those orders. (Record at 46-48, 78-83, 128-130, 135-146) 
On August 12, 1992, the Defendant requested a Scheduling 
Conference. (Record at 63-64) The matter was then set for trial 
and the trial was held on December 3, 4, and 10, 1992. (Record at 
268-274) Following the trial the Court announced its Findings and 
Decree. A motion to supplement the Findings and Order and a Motion 
for Rehearing on certain issues was filed by the Defendant on 
January 13, 1993. (Record at 283-287, 290-292) All pending post 
trial motions were then set for hearing, on February 25, 1993. 
However, prior to that hearing on February 9, 1993, the trial court 
had signed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Decree 
of Divorce was signed and the Findings and Decree were entered on 
February 19, 1993. (Record at 359-382) On March 31, 1993, the 
Court signed its Order disposing of the pending post trial motions 
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and that Order was entered on or about April 1, 1993. (Record at 
406-411) On March 16, 1993, the Defendant filed a Notice of 
Appeal, after the Court had entered its decision on the post trial 
motions but before Defendant had received the Court's Order 
disposing of those motions. (Record at 392-393) Contemporaneous 
with the filing of the Docketing Statement in this proceeding, the 
Defendant filed an Amended Notice of Appeal with the trial court 
seeking review of the Court's Order disposing of the post trial 
motions as well as review of the Court's initial Findings and 
Decree. (Record at 474-475) 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. The parties to this action were married in Las Vegas 
Nevada, on August 17, 1985. (Record at 2; (1Transcript of trial at 
485) This was the second marriage for each party. (T. at 85 and 
417) 
2. At the time of the parties' marriage, the Defendant owned 
a furnished home in Mission Hills, California, in which he had 
substantial eguity, (T. at 488-489) and substantial personal 
property including automobiles, a boat, etc. (T. at 489-496, 501-
507) In addition, the Defendant had savings and checking accounts 
and two IRA accounts. (T. at 483-486) The Defendant retired from 
the Air Force in 1983 and had been receiving monthly income as a 
result of a fully vested retirement benefit prior to the time he 
married Plaintiff. (T. at 487) The Defendant had obtained 
1Transcript of the trial held December 3, 4, and 10, 1992, 
will hereafter be referred to by the title "T" followed by the page 
number of the transcript to which reference is made. 
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employment as an engineer with Lockheed Advanced Development 
Company in the State of California on April 2, 1985. (T. at 482) 
3. At the time of the parties' marriage, the Plaintiff owned 
a 1969 Porsche automobile (T. at 179), in need of repair, (T. at 
638) and a waterbed, portable 19" TV, some clothing and one dresser 
drawers. (T. at 508) Plaintiff was also the beneficiary of two 
trust deeds totaling approximately $70,000.00, secured by a home 
awarded to a former husband in a prior divorce proceeding (T. at 
533) and she owned a one-half interest in Johnny's Auto. (T. at 
934) The notes were in default (T. at 341) and she never realized 
anything as a result of her interest in that business, in part 
because of her exhusband's bankruptcy. (T. a 534-535) 
4. Following the parties' marriage, the Defendant supported 
the Plaintiff and her minor son, who resided with the parties until 
their separation in May of 1993. (T. at 379) The Plaintiff's 
former husband paid only $150.00 of the $800.00 per month in child 
support he was ordered to pay during that period of time (T. at 381 
and 200) leaving a receivable, for the approximately 80 1/2 months 
the parties resided together, of approximately $64,250.00. 
5. After the parties' marriage, the Defendant assisted the 
Plaintiff in efforts to foreclose her lien on the home awarded to 
the Plaintiff's former husband. (T at 369 and 535) Plaintiff's 
former husband then filed bankruptcy. (T at 535 and 630) In order 
to avoid foreclosure sale of the property by a prior lien holder, 
Defendant paid the first mortgage payments due on the home and, 
after the parties had moved to Utah and Plaintiff was residing 
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there full time, Defendant continued to pursue legal remedies in 
order to obtain a release of that property from the bankruptcy and 
ultimately foreclose same. (T at 537,583, and 633) Defendant 
expended substantial time and financial resources in that effort 
and to improve the property. These efforts ultimately proved 
successful. (T at 583-584 and 585) During the course of these 
efforts, the Plaintiff deeded the property to the Defendant and the 
property was then sold. (T at 586) The proceeds of sale were used 
to pay existing debt and to pay a down payment to purchase the 
Sportsmen's Lounge, a business located in Cedar City, Utah, and the 
real property on which that property is located. (T at 583 and 587-
588) 
6. After the parties moved to Utah and acquired the 
Sportsmen' Lounge, Defendant continued to work at Lockheed, 
commuting between California and Utah. (T at 593) Defendant 
continued to maintain his residence in the state of Utah but he 
also had a room in California where he would sleep on week nights. 
(T at 619) Initially Defendant commuted by car. (T at 633) However, 
eventually Defendant obtained a pilot's license and purchased an 
airplane so that he could reduce the time involved in that commute. 
(T at 634) He then began commuting twice each week as weather 
would permit; he spent three or four days each week in California. 
(T at 636) 
7. After the parties' marriage, Defendant sold his home in 
Mission Hills, California, and used the equity realized upon the 
sale to, among other things, pay the $37,000.00 down payment on a 
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home purchased in Cedar City, Utah, at 1098 South Fir Street, and 
purchased a $5,000,00 Jacuzzi for the home. (T at 518-519) When 
that home was purchased, it was titled in the Defendant' name alone 
and Defendant signed the Promissory Note. (T at 82 and 528) 
However, for reasons which were not explained at trial, Plaintiff's 
name appears as a joint obligor on the Trust Deed securing the 
balance of the purchase price and a rider to the note. (T at 35-
38) At trial Defendant maintained that Plaintiff had affirmatively 
waived any interest in that residence when it was purchased. (T at 
550) Plaintiff denies that she had done so and maintained that she 
was a co-owner of the property although her name did not appear on 
title. (T at 46) All mortgage payments for the home at 1098 South 
Fir Street were made with the proceeds of the Defendant's 
premarital Air Force retirement account which he maintained in a 
segregated bank account over which the Plaintiff had no signature 
rights or control. (T at 601-602) 
8. Following the parties' separation, Defendant continued to 
stay at the room he had rented in California and the Plaintiff was 
awarded possession of the residence at 1098 South Fir Street in 
Cedar City, Utah. (Record at 42) Defendant was ordered to pay 
Plaintiff the sum of $1,000.00 per month as temporary support and 
he did so until trial. (Record at 42) In conjunction with the 
Court's Order that Defendant pay temporary support to the 
Plaintiff, the Court also ordered that the Plaintiff continue to 
manage the Sportsmen's Lounge but that she account to the Court for 
all activities with reference to the Lounge and that she "draw no 
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funds from the business." (Record at 42) In August of 1992, without 
the Defendant's knowledge or the Court's permission, the Defendant 
began paying herself a salary of $1,000.00 per month from the 
Sportsmen's Lounge. (T at 362 and 420) From that time until the 
date of trial the Plaintiff received $1,000.00 per month from the 
Lounge, plus $1,000.00 per month temporary support from the 
Defendant. (T at 362 and 193) 
9. At the time of the parties' separation, Defendant had a 
401K and salaried savings plan with his employer. (T at 568) The 
Defendant continued to contribute to that salaried savings plan and 
401K after the separation. (T at 573) All of the income earned from 
Defendant's employment from which those contributions were made was 
earned in the State of California. (T at 569-570) 
10. At the time of the parties' separation there was an 
outstanding credit card debt that had been incurred for travel 
expenses associated with the Defendant's use of the airplane in 
commuting to work from the state of Utah in the amount of 
approximately $4,882.00. (T at 592-593) That credit card debt had 
been historically considered a debt of the Sportsmen's Lounge and 
had been paid as an operating expense of the Sportsmen's Lounge. (T 
at 370-371) The Trial Court's initial Findings and Decree did not 
address allocation of that debt although Defendant asked that it be 
taxed as an obligation of the Sportsmen's Lounge. 
11. Early on in the proceedings, the Court through the 
Domestic Court Commissioner had directed that an income tax refund 
in the Defendant's possession be "used for business expenses". 
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(Record at 42) The Defendant had used a portion of that tax refund 
to pay accounting fees and airport hanger fees. (T at 594) The 
balance he held in his checking account during the pendency of the 
proceedings because of some inconsistency regarding the Court's 
treatment of the travel expense debt that remained outstanding. (T 
at 651) 
12. Following trial, the Court ruled that the home at 1098 
South Fir Street was a marital asset and refused to award the 
Defendant any premarital or separate property interest in the same. 
(Record at 369) The Court ordered that the home be sold and the 
proceeds divided egually between the parties. (Record at 370) 
Pending sale the Plaintiff was granted possession of the home and 
ordered to make the payment on the first mortgage. (Record at 370) 
13. The Court valued all assets as of the date of trial, 
including the salaried savings plan into which Defendant had 
continued to make contributions from his earnings following the 
parties' separation. (T at 371) 
14. In its Decree of Divorce, the Court, for the most part, 
returned to each party his or her premarital property, except the 
1988 Jaguar, and directed that certain items of personal property 
be sold, including the airplane, against which there is a 
substantial indebtedness, the Blazer automobile, left in 
Plaintiff's possession which had been damaged while in the 
possession of the Plaintiff and her son, the motor home, and the 
1988 Jaguar automobile in which the Defendant claimed a premarital 
property interest. (Record at 379) The Court ordered that the 
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proceeds of sale of those items be divided equally between the 
parties. (Record at 379) 
15. The Court ruled that Plaintiff's child support receivable 
due from her former spouse for the child Defendant had supported 
during the marriage of these parties was not an asset which should 
be considered in the Court's division of property. (Record at 363) 
The Court also ruled that, despite both parties' acknowledgement 
that the value of the Plaintiff's premarital Porsche automobile had 
been substantially enhanced through repairs and refurbishing during 
the marriage, that the marital estate had no interest in that 
asset. (Record at 365) 
16. In its Decree of Divorce, the Court did not rule on the 
Defendant's request that the Plaintiff repay the salary which she 
had drawn from the Sportsmen's Lounge in violation of the Court's 
previous Order and declined to find her in contempt by having done 
so in essence denying Defendant's request in that regard. (Record 
at 375-382) 
17. Certain issues which had not been addressed by the Court 
in the Decree of Divorce were the subject of a Motion to Supplement 
Findings. (Record at 283-287) Following a hearing on that Motion, 
the Court declined to award to the Defendant anything for damage to 
his fire arms caused by the Plaintiff's child while the fire arms 
were left in her possession during the pendency of these 
proceedings, denied Defendant's request that the credit card debt 
for travel expenses incurred prior to the parties' separation, 
traditionally paid by the Sportsmen's Lounge, be considered a 
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marital debt, and held Defendant in contempt for not paying to 
Plaintiff one-half of the remaining tax refund although Defendant 
maintained that the reason he had not paid Plaintiff her share of 
the tax refund as ordered by the Court, was because of the pending 
Motions relating to allocation of the credit card debt. (Record at 
406-411) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In this case the trial court was faced with, among other 
things, the responsibility to determine whether certain assets were 
the separate property of either party or marital assets and then 
equitably divide the property available. The trial court found 
that the Defendant's home at 1098 South Fir Street in Cedar City, 
Utah, was a marital asset even though the down payment and all of 
the mortgage payments had been made with the Defendant's premarital 
pron^rty. The trial court then ordered that the proceeds of the 
sale of the home be divided equally between the parties, ignoring 
the fact that the down payment and the reduction in principal on 
the outstanding mortgage were paid with the Defendant's separate 
property. The trial court's findings and order in that regard 
violate well recognized principles for treatment of premarital 
assets and/or contribution of premarital property toward 
acquisition of assets during the marriage. Likewise, the court 
failed to recognize the Defendant's premarital interest in the 1988 
Jaguar automobile, an asset acquired during the marriage in part 
with his premarital assets and failed to recognize a marital 
interest in the Plaintiff's Porsche automobile which had been hers 
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prior to the marriage but the value of which had been substantially 
enhanced during the marriage through the expenditure of either the 
Defendant's separate or the parties' marital funds. 
Several of the issues presented for review by the Court of 
Appeals involve treatment of assets either acquired with post 
separation earnings or held post separation by one of the two 
parties pending final hearing. In the state of Utah, as a general 
rule, assets should be valued as of the date of divorce. However, 
if a party has dissipated an asset, i.e., has been responsible for 
substantially decreasing the value of the asset, then the party who 
is responsible for the reduction in value should account to the 
marital estate for the dissipation of that asset. Similarly, if an 
asset has been substantially increased in value through the efforts 
of the party who has exclusive control of that asset, the asset 
should be valued as of the parties' separation date. In this case 
the Defendant continued to contribute toward his salaried savings 
plan following the parties' separation by contributing post 
separation earnings to increase the value of the plan. Since the 
marital partnership had nothing to do with the enhancement of that 
asset, separation date is the appropriate date to value that asset. 
This is even more clearly the case in this instance where the 
earnings which the Defendant contributed to increase the value of 
his salaried savings plan after the parties' separation were his 
separate property under the law of the jurisdiction where the 
earnings were obtained and the salaried savings plan maintained. 
Certain assets, both marital and Defendant's premarital 
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property, were left in the control of the Plaintiff while this 
action was pending. The Plaintiff withdrew money from the parties' 
jointly owned business in violation of an order rendered by the 
Domestic Court Commissioner. In addition the Plaintiff's son 
damaged Defendant's firearms, conceded to be his separate property, 
and the parties' Blazer automobile was damaged during the parties' 
separation while in Plaintiff's control. Plaintiff should be held 
to account for the decrease in value of these items. She should be 
ordered to reimburse the marital estate for the marital property 
"dissipated" and pay Defendant the amount by which the value of his 
separate property had been damaged while in her control. 
In this case the trial court failed to consider all of the 
assets of the parties. During the parties' marriage the Plaintiff 
had accumulated a receivable for unpaid child support against a 
former spouse. The Defendant had provided substantially all of the 
support for the child for whom Plaintiff was entitled to receive 
that child support. That asset is at least as viable a receivable 
as any other receivable would be since child support is, in many 
respects, a preferred obligation. This receivable should have been 
considered an asset of the marriage, awarded to the Plaintiff, and 
taken into account when allocating other assets of the marriage to 
the parties. 
At the time the parties were separated there was an 
outstanding debt for travel expenses incurred in conjunction with 
the Defendant's commuting between Cedar City, Utah and his 
employment in the state of California. That expense had 
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historically been paid as a debt of the parties' jointly owned 
business. The Court's determination that the business should not 
be responsible to pay that debt but, instead, imposing upon 
Defendant the full responsibility to pay that business obligation, 
was not equitable, especially in light of the Court's declared 
intent to equally divide the equity in the jointly owned business. 
At the hearing on February 25, 1993, the Court found the 
Defendant in contempt for failure to pay to the Plaintiff one-half 
of the tax refund. However, on May 21, 1992, the Domestic Court 
Commissioner had ordered that that refund was to be used for bills 
associated with the Lounge. In light of the Defendant's belief 
that the bill for travel expenses was a business debt it is not 
unreasonable that the Defendant would have retained those funds 
until the Court decided whether the travel expenses should be 
considered a business debt and, if so, paid with the income tax 
refund. The Defendant's retaining those funds does not constitute 
contempt under these circumstances. 
ARGUMENT 
A. INCLUDING ONE SPOUSE'S SEPARATE ASSET IN THE MARITAL 
ESTATE IS APPROPRIATE IF THAT ASSET HAS BEEN COMMINGLED WITH 
MARITAL PROPERTY, CONTRIBUTED TO THE MARITAL ESTATE, OR ITS VALUE 
ENHANCED THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF THE OTHER SPOUSE. ABSENT ONE OF 
THOSE THREE EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES, SEPARATE PROPERTY SHOULD 
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NOT BE INCLUDED IN THE DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY• 
1. The home on South Fir Street in Cedar City, Utah, is the 
Defendant's separate property. 
The basic rule regarding division of property between spouses 
is that "the Court should make such orders in relation to the 
property as may be equitable" Bushnell v. Bushnell, 649 P.2d 85 at 
87 (Utah 1982). However, "as a general rule, equity requires that 
each party retain the separate property he or she brought into the 
marriage" Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421 at 424 (Utah App. 1990) 
citing Painter v. Painter, 752 P.2d 907, 908 (Utah App. 1988), as 
well as any "application or enhancement of its value". Mortensen v. 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 at 308 (Ut 1988) 
In Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990) the Court was 
asked to reconsider a divorce decree which had awarded to the 
defendant spouse a home purchased with her inheritance but had 
awarded to the plaintiff husband the marital residence which, 
defendant claimed on appeal, should have been acknowledged as a 
joint asset with each party awarded an interest in the same. The 
defendant wife argued that, by awarding the marital residence, 
which was a joint asset, to the plaintiff, the Court had, in 
essence, awarded the plaintiff a portion of her inheritance. In 
addressing that issue, the Court considered the general rule with 
reference to separate property. The Court of Appeals stated 
Such property [separate property] may appropriately be 
considered part of the marital estate, subject to 
division, when the other spouse by his or her efforts 
augmented, maintained, or protected the inherited or 
donated property, (citations omitted), where the parties 
had inextricably commingled the property with marital 
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property so that it has lost its separate character, 
(citations omitted) or where the recipient spouse has 
contributed all or part of the property to the marital 
estate." Burt, 799 P.2d at 1169. 
The Court found it to be significant that the recipient of 
inherited property had attempted to keep the property separate 
during the marriage and stated that: 
The separate character of the defendant's inheritance has 
been maintained in separated accounts in portfolios and 
the home she purchased. Conversion from one investment 
medium to another does not by itself, destroy the 
integrity of segregation. Burt, 799 P.2d at 1169. 
The Burt case was remanded to the trial court for further 
findings to determine whether there were extraordinary situations 
where equity demanded that the plaintiff be awarded an interest in 
the defendant's separate property. The Court set forth a three 
step process which should be followed in considering property 
division in divorce cases. The Court stated: 
On remand, the Court should first properly categorize the 
parties' property as part of the marital estate or as the 
separate property of one or the other. Each party is 
presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate 
property and fifty percent of the marital property. 
Second, the Court stated: 
The Court should then consider the existence of 
exceptional circumstances and, if any be shown, proceed 
to an equitable distribution in light of those 
circumstances and in conformity with our decision. 
Finally: 
That having been done, the final step is to consider 
whether, following appropriate divisions of the property, 
one party or the other is entitled to alimony." Burt, 799 
P.2d at 1172. 
Consistent with the ruling at Burt, the trial court should 
first proceed to determine which property should be considered 
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separate property and which property should be considered marital 
property. Although the Burt case discusses separate property in 
terms of inherited or donated property, the same rule would apply 
with reference to premarital property which has been acknowledged 
as "separate property ... brought into the marriage," Haumont v. 
Haumont, 793 P.2d 421 at 424 (Utah App. 1990). 
After the property has been properly classified as separate or 
marital property, a trial court should then, consistent with the 
Burt decision, determine whether there are exceptional 
circumstances which mandate that the separate property of either 
spouse be included in the marital estate. 
In Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421 (Utah App. 1991) citing 
Moon v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah App. 1990), the Court stated 
that the 
appropriate factors for the trial court to consider in 
including premarital property as part of the marital 
estate include 'the amount and kind of property to be 
divided, the source of the property, the parties' health, 
the parties' standard of living and respective financial 
conditions, their needs and earning capacities, the 
duration of marriage and the relationship the property 
has with the amount of alimony awarded. Haumont, 793 
P.2d at 425. 
The Court in Haumont suggested nine factors that may be 
considered by the trial court in determining whether or not to 
follow the presumption that "eguity reguires that each party retain 
the separate property he or she brought into the marriage." 
However, in light of the decision in Burt, which distilled those 
factors to three, this Court should consider Plaintiff's claim to 
an award of Plaintiff's premarital assets in the context of the 
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three exceptional circumstances identified in Burt, although the 
other factors identified in Haumont, including length of the 
marriage, certainly support Defendant's claim that the home not be 
included in the marital estate. 
In Georgedes v. Georqedes, 627 P.2d 44 (Utah 1981), Plaintiff 
husband had brought a home and a business into the marriage. The 
home was subsequently titled in joint tenancy with the Defendant. 
The trial court divided the property by allocating to each party 
the property he or she brought into the marriage. This gave the 
Plaintiff the home and business. The marriage had lasted seven 
years. Although the record on appeal in that case contained 
relatively little evidence of the present value of the home and the 
business awarded to the Plaintiff, the Supreme Court said: 
That is not a reversible deficiency where, as here, the 
court's decree simply puts the parties to a second 
marriage of relatively short real duration back into sole 
ownership of the properties they brought into the 
marriage. Georqedes, 627 P.2 at 45. 
Citing language from English v. English 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 
1977), the Court stated: 
This is not a case where the court would be required to 
conclude from the evidence that the Defendant's 
'efforts... in the monetary success of the marriage, ' 
made such a contribution to the increased value of the 
marital property that she would be entitled to share in 
that value in the property settlement.' Georgedes, 627 
P.2d at 45. 
When a marriage is a second marriage and of relatively short 
duration, (approximately seven years) it is apparently generally 
equitable that the parties be placed back into sole ownership of 
the properties each brought into the marriage. 
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It is important to note that, in making an equitable division, 
the owner of separate property should not lose the benefit of his 
or her separate property by the trial court automatically or 
arbitrarily awarding the other spouse an equal amount of the 
remaining property which was acquired by their joint efforts to 
offset the separate property. Mortensen/ 760 P.2d at 308. In 
Mortensen the Court focused its analyses on gifts or inherited 
property. However, this same analysis would be appropriate in 
analyzing marital property as well. In Mortensen. the Court went on 
to state: "These rules will preserve and give effect to the right 
that married persons have always had in this state to separately 
own and enjoy property." Mortensen. 7 60 P.2d at 308. 
Where, as here, the Appellant challenges the factual findings 
of the trial court, the Appellant has the responsibility to 
marshall the evidence in support of the trial court's factual 
finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to 
support that finding. Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P. 2 828 (Utah 
1992) In this instance, the following testimony and evidence was 
presented by the Plaintiff in support of her claim that the home in 
Cedar City was a martial asset: those parties looked for a home in 
Cedar City (T. at 30 to 31); Plaintiff signed the Trust Deed Note 
and a rider to that Note, recorded several months later. (T. at 
35-38); some preliminary documentation prepared in conjunction with 
the purchase of the property identify the Plaintiff in conjunction 
with that purchase (T. at 43, 61, and 62); at one point the seller 
thought that she was selling it to both parties (T. at 299); 
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Plaintiff thought she was a party to the purchase (T. at 46, 56, 
365); the parties initially intended that Plaintiff's name would be 
on the title (T. at 656); the Plaintiff thought she was on title 
until this litigation (T. at 442 and 668); Plaintiff, at one point, 
believed that the money for payment of the down payment of the home 
came from the parties' joint account (T. at 71). However, she 
acknowledged that she did not know where the funds came from to buy 
the home (T. at 52); Plaintiff took care of the home (T. at 75), 
and certain improvements were made to the home after the home was 
purchased, including adding hardwood floors and remodeling the 
kitchen. (T. at 226-227) 
There never was a satisfactory explanation offered at trial 
with reference to why the Plaintiff's name appeared on the Trust 
Deed and the rider to the Promissory Note and yet did not appear on 
other documents involved in the closing. However, as the testimony 
developed, it was apparent that the down payment for purchase of 
the home and the funds with which the Jacuzzi, added to the home, 
was purchased, came from the sale of the Defendant's pre-marital 
home in Mission Hills, California, (T. at 518-519) which the 
Plaintiff admitted were the Defendant's pre-marital funds (T. at 
431), in which she did not claim any interest (T. at 399) because 
the Mission Hills home was the Defendant's pre-marital asset (T. at 
490) and there was likewise no evidence offered to contradict the 
Defendant's claim that all of the mortgage payments made to 
purchase the home came from the Defendant's Langley Credit Union 
checking account (T. at 601-602) into which the Defendant's pre-
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marital and separate Air Force retirement had been deposited (T. at 
396) and into which no other funds were deposited during the 
marriage. (T. at 499) The Defendant acknowledged that the parties 
had initially intended to combine the proceeds of the sale of his 
pre-marital home with the proceeds of the sale of the home in which 
the Plaintiff had a pre-marital interest and purchase a home. (T. 
at 535) However, certain problems developed, including the 
bankruptcy proceeding filed by the Plaintiff's ex-husband, who was 
the owner of the home in which she claimed a pre-marital interest, 
and the parties were unable to accomplish that goal. (T. at 535-
537) The parties then decided to look for a home in Utah (T. at 
537), purchase a home in Utah with the Defendant's pre-marital 
funds and later pay that home off with the proceeds realized upon 
foreclosure and sale of the home in which Plaintiff claimed a pre-
marital property interest. (T. at 540) Because of the Plaintiff's 
bad credit, the home was purchased in the Defendant's name alone. 
(T. at 539) This initial plan changed, however, and, following the 
expenditure of substantial sums of money, time and effort to 
foreclose Plaintiff's security interest in the home in which she 
claimed a pre-marital interest, the parties determined to invest a 
portion of the proceeds of the sale of that home in a business in 
Cedar City instead of using those funds to pay off the mortgage on 
the home titled in Defendant's name. (T. at 661) 
This is a marriage of relatively short duration in which the 
Defendant contributed his premarital, separate property toward the 
acquisition of a home in Cedar City after the property was 
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acquired. He clearly intended to maintain the separate nature of 
his premarital property in the same by making all mortgage payments 
from a separate bank account into which only income from his 
separate, premarital retirement account was deposited. The home 
should have been acknowledged as his separate property and, in the 
absence of any of the extraordinary circumstances identified in the 
Burt case, should not have been included in the marital estate. 
2. The trial court's Order that the home on South Fir Street 
be sold and the proceeds divided equally between the parties does 
not constitute an equitable division of the property. 
Even if the Court's finding that the home on South Fir 
Street in Cedar City, Utah, was a marital asset were supported by 
the evidence, the Court's decision to treat that asset the same as 
the Sportsmen's Lounge, that is order that the same be sold and the 
proceeds divided equally between the parties is not an equitable 
division of the assets. The down payment on the home on South Fir 
Street was paid with the proceeds of the sale of Defendant's 
premarital home, an asset in which the Plaintiff claimed no 
interest (T. at 399) and the payments on that home were made with 
the Defendant's separate premarital funds. (T. at 601-602) There 
is clearly a premarital interest in that asset even if the asset 
itself were considered marital property. On the other hand, the 
Sportsmen's Lounge, purchased two years later with the proceeds of 
the sale of what had been Plaintiff's premarital property was 
properly found to be a marital asset. 
At the time the parties were married the Plaintiff did 
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have*an asset, an account receivable in the form of Trust Deeds 
with a face amount of $70,000.00 secured by a home awarded to her 
exhusband in her first divorce. However, those Trust Deeds were in 
default. (T. at 341-342) The Defendant expended substantial effort 
in order to preserve that asset by initiating legal action to 
foreclose the property, making payments on the first mortgage 
during the Plaintiff's exhusband's bankruptcy, initiating legal 
action to obtain release from the Bankruptcy Court, foreclosing the 
property and selling it. (T. at 534-540) In addition, the 
Defendant, by his efforts, together with other family members, 
enhanced the value of the property by physically working on the 
premises prior to its sale. (T. at 583-584) The third prong of the 
test identified in Burt to determine whether a premarital asset has 
become marital is established by the Defendant's significant 
efforts to preserve, protect and improve that property. However, 
the property was also clearly contributed toward the marital estate 
when the Plaintiff deeded the property to the Defendant during the 
marriage (T. at 432-433). 
The trial court correctly acknowledged that the 
Sportsmen's Lounge, purchased with the proceeds of the sale of the 
Aqua Dulce home in California is a marital asset and the proceeds 
of sale of that asset should be divided equally between the 
parties. However, the home on South Fir Street presents an 
entirely different situation. Plaintiff did nothing to preserve, 
protect or improve the home in Cedar City except to maintain the 
property incident to residing there. It is patently inequitable to 
26 
take an asset purchased with clearly premarital funds and treat 
that in the same manner as an asset which, although it may trace 
its origin to premarital funds, through the substantial efforts of 
the other spouse, became a marital asset. 
The Defendant has a premarital interest in that asset equal to 
the down payment and the reduction in principal on the first trust 
deed during the parties' marriage and the trial court erred in not 
acknowledging that premarital interest and awarding to the 
Defendant a separate and premarital interest in the home in that 
amount. 
3. The trial court should have acknowledged the Defendant's 
interest in the Jaguar automobile and included only a portion of 
its value in the marital estate. 
The only testimony offered by the Plaintiff with reference to 
the Jaguar automobile is that it was purchased during the marriage 
(T. at 175) and that it was purchased as a gift for her (T. at 
400). However, that latter issue was hotly contested by Cynthia 
Garcia, the Defendant's daughter, who Plaintiff identified as a 
witness to Defendant's supposed announcement that the Jaguar was 
purchased as a gift for the Plaintiff (T. at 476). Defendant, on 
the other hand, testified that acquisition of the 1988 Jaguar 
automobile had its origins in a 1984 Corvette, purchased for 
$15,000.00 with $6,000.00 premarital funds. That vehicle was sold 
for $9,000.00, (T. at 560) of which at least 40% was premarital 
funds. That $9,000.00 was combined with the approximately $10,000 
home equity loan secured by the Cedar City home to purchase the 
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Jaguar. (T. at 559-560, and 554) Accordingly, 40% of the $9,000.00 
proceeds from sale of the 1984 Corvette, approximately 20% of the 
total purchase price, is directly traceable to the Defendant's 
premarital funds if the home eguity loan is considered a marital 
asset and should be returned to Defendant before the marital 
interest in that asset is distributed. If, on the other hand, the 
home is acknowledged as Defendant's separate property and he is 
assigned the obligation to pay that debt himself, Defendant should 
be paid 70% of the proceeds of sale of the vehicle before the 
marital interest of 30% is distributed. The trial court's ruling 
that the 1988 Jaguar automobile is a marital asset without 
acknowledging Defendant's entitlement to be reimbursed for his 
premarital interest in the same ignores the obvious intent of the 
Defendant to retain a premarital interest in that vehicle by 
titling it in his name alone (T. at 188) and the general rule of 
equity that a party's premarital assets be returned to him upon 
divorce unless the extraordinary circumstances identified in Burt 
are present. 
4. The trial court should have included in its award of 
marital property to the Plaintiff a dollar figure representing the 
marital interest in the Porsche automobile and award the Defendant 
assets to offset that amount. 
Defendant does not dispute that the Plaintiff's Porsche 
automobile is a premarital asset. (T. at 179) However, more than 
$10,000.00 in repairs were made on the Porsche during the marriage 
(T. at 376). That substantially enhanced its value. Because the 
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repairs and improvements to the Porsche were paid for by the 
Defendant (T. at 377), a substantial amount of the Porsche 
automobile should have been included in the marital state. At 
trial the Defendant set the value of the Porsche at $7,000.00 (T. 
at 180) Although Plaintiff testified that Defendant told her he 
should be reimbursed for the repairs when the home in Auga Dulce 
sold, (T. at 670) she does not know if he was reimbursed. 
Defendant testified that he was not reimbursed for the repairs to 
the Porsche. (T. at 657) However, even if Defendant received 
"reimbursement" from the proceeds of sale of the Aqua Dulce home, 
those proceeds were marital property. When the parties married, 
the Porsche needed a new engine, transmission, paint, wheels & 
stereo. In light of the evidence and the admitted expenditure of 
marital funds toward the substantial enhancement of the value of 
that vehicle during the marriage, the marital estate should have 
been acknowledged to have had an interest equal to at least the 
value of the vehicle and the Defendant should have been awarded 
marital property of equal value to offset the award of the vehicle 
to Plaintiff. 
B. IF AN ASSET HAS BEEN DISSIPATED OR ENHANCED IN VALUE BY 
ONE OF THE PARTIES TO A DIVORCE PROCEEDING FOLLOWING SEPARATION THE 
ASSET SHOULD BE VALUED AS OF THE DATE OF SEPARATION. 
1. The Defendant's salaried savings plan should be valued as 
of the date of separation/ not the date of the divorce decree. 
In Utah, assets usually are valued at the time of the divorce 
decree. Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050 (Utah App. 1987). But Peck 
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acknowledges that if one party has dissipated an asset then the 
trial court may value the property at an earlier date, i.e., 
separation. Jd. Unfortunately, Defendant is aware of no recent 
Utah appellant court decision that addresses what should happen if 
a party has, through his or her separate efforts, enhanced rather 
than dissipated an asset of the marriage. 
•In Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980), the Utah 
Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claim that his equity in the 
home purchased subsequent to the plaintiff's filing for divorce 
should not have been considered a marital asset subject to 
division. In reaching that decision, the Court relied on Utah Code 
Annotated § 30-30-5 and "the rulings of this Court in accordance 
therewith." Utah Code Ann. § 30-30-5 does not specify a date for 
the valuation of assets, except to direct that the Court may 
indicate in its decree of divorce equitable orders relating to 
property when the decree is rendered. UCA §30-3-5(1). However, the 
Court specifically cited to Hamilton v. Hamilton/ 562 P. 2d 235 
(Utah 1977), and Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980) 
with reference to the valuation date issue. In Hamilton, there 
was a four month gap between the time the divorce was rendered and 
signed. During that time, the defendant had conveyed property to a 
third party and represented himself to be a "single man". The 
decree of divorce had directed that the real property in the name 
of the defendant and owned by the parties should remain in joint 
ownership as tenants in common until the court, by further order, 
directed distribution of the division of property. Plaintiff 
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claimed that the decree of divorce vested in her a one-half 
interest in the real property conveyed to the third party. The 
Supreme Court determined that, since the property had been 
transferred prior to entry of the decree of divorce, the decree did 
not vest any title in the property in the plaintiff. 
However, in light of the Peck decision, which clearly 
indicates that the court, in the exercise of its discretion, may 
value assets at a date other than the date of divorce if the 
property has been dissipated since separation, the Hamilton case 
does not act to prohibit the trial court from considering an 
alternate valuation date. 
In Jesperson, the defendant asked the court to award him the 
value of his labor on three personal residences purchased and sold 
during the marriage. The court disposed of that argument by 
holding that "the marital estate is evaluated according to what 
property exists at the time the marriage is terminated." Jesperson/ 
326, P. 2d at 328. (citing Hamilton, 562 P.2d 235. However, in 
light of recent developments in that area of the law since 
Jesperson, it is apparent that a trial court may evaluate an item 
of property in the marital estate according to that property's 
value on the date of separation if there are circumstances to 
warrant an alternate valuation date. 
To the extent Fletcher suggests that there are no 
circumstances where an asset, enhanced by the exclusive efforts of 
one party, cannot be valued as of the date of separation, it should 
be overturned. The better rule is found in Re: Marriage of Wagner, 
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679 P.2d 743 (Mont. 1984) in which the Supreme Court of that State 
reaffirmed: 
The time for proper valuation cannot be tied to any 
single event in the dissolution process. The filing of 
a petition, trial of the matter, or even the granting of 
a decree of dissolution do not control the proper point 
of evaluation by the district court. The exercise of 
discretion by the district court is necessary when 
determining the worth of marital assets which fluctuate 
in value. 
The court concluded 
To consider for distribution those assets acquired by one 
spouse after the marital relationship was terminated 
might unjustly award a "windfall" to the dilatory spouse 
who did not work to accumulate those post marital assets 
and penalize the diligent spouse for sound business 
judgment. Wagner, 679 P.2d at 758. 
The date of separation is an appropriate date to consider 
valuation of marital assets where "the marriage was irretrievably 
broken and individual business practices have not yet altered the 
financial status quo of the parties." Wagner 679 P.2d at 759. 
Marriage in the state of Utah has been compared to a 
partnership. Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 at Note 1 (Utah, 
1988). Although the comparison is not absolute, the general 
concept that two individuals work together toward a common goal, 
each providing a valuable services to the success of the marital 
relationship, has been relied upon in determining a spouse's 
interest in what would otherwise be the separate property of the 
other spouse. 
In Dunn v. Dunn, 808 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), defendant 
husband was awarded his entire premarital contribution to a 
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retirement account because there was no evidence that the plaintiff 
wife had "through her efforts, augmented, maintained, or protected 
the separate property, other than her maintenance of the household 
accounts." The Dunn Court acknowledged in that case that equitable 
division of property contemplates that "property be fairly divided 
between the parties given their contributions during the marriage 
and their circumstances at the time of the divorce". Dunn/ 808 P.2d 
at 1320. Dunn specifically acknowledged that contributions during 
the marriage would include lo^e, encouragement, companionship, 
homemaking skills, etc. Once the Plaintiff and Defendant in this 
case separated, the equitable basis for allocating to the Plaintiff 
a share of the Defendant's earned income no longer existed. 
This case is fairly unique because the parties have maintained 
a residence in this state, but the Defendant's employment is in 
California. Since the employment as well as the retirement benefits 
associated with that employment are within that state, California 
law should apply to determine at what point during the divorce 
process the Defendant's earnings are his separate property. 
California Civil Code §5118 provides: 
The earnings and accumulations of a spouse and minor 
children living with, or in the custody of, the spouse, 
while living separate and apart from the other spouse, 
are the separate property of the spouse. 
Applying that statute to the facts here where the Defendant 
has been living separate and apart from the Plaintiff since the 
first part of May, 1992, this Court should determine that the 
Defendant's earnings after separation are his sole and separate 
property. Thus, the Defendant's earnings, retirement benefits and 
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any increase in savings or checking accounts accumulated since the 
date, of separation should be his sole and separate property. 
Accordingly, the date for valuation of the Defendant's retirement 
benefits, as well as the date for valuation of savings and checking 
accounts into which were deposited the Defendant's earnings, should 
be the date of separation. 
In light of California Civil Code §5118 designating the 
earnings of a spouse following separation as his or her separate 
property, and Utah statutory and case law which suggests that the 
same rule should be applied in Utah as well, Defendant respectfully 
submits that his earnings following separation and any assets 
acquired with those earnings, including enhancement of his 
retirement or savings accounts, should be considered his sole and 
separate property. Accordingly, saving accounts, checking 
accounts, and retirement benefits should be valued as of the date 
of separation. 
2. The Plaintiff should have been ordered to repay to the 
marital estate funds she withdrew from the Sportsmen's Lounge in 
violation of orders issued by the Domestic Court Commissioner. 
On May 25, 1992, the trial court commissioner ordered the 
Plaintiff not to withdraw any funds from the Sportsmen's Lounge. 
(Record at 42) In violation of that Order, Plaintiff paid herself 
a salary of $1,000.00 per month in August of 1992. (T. at 362) 
She continued to pay herself a monthly salary of $1,000.00, without 
informing the Defendant until the date of trial. During that time, 
she also received the full amount of support that Defendant was 
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ordered to pay. The Plaintiff withdrew funds from a marital asset, 
the Sportsmen's Lounge, in violation of the Court order, thus 
dissipating the value of that asset to her benefit. Plaintiff 
should have been ordered by the trial court to account for and 
repay those funds to the marital estate. 
Upon sale of the Sportsmen's Lounge, an offset should be 
ordered against the Plaintiff's interest in the proceeds of sale so 
that the marital estate is reimbursed for that withdrawal of funds 
in the amount of $5,500.00. ($1,000.00 per month for each month 
from mid August through December, 1992.) 
3. The Blazer automobile should have been valued as of the 
date of the parties' separation and the same awarded to the 
Plaintiff at that value. 
At the time of the parties' separation, the Blazer automobile 
had a value of $3,500.00. That value declined to $1,500.00 at the 
time of trial. (T. at 582) The Blazer automobile was within the 
control of the Plaintiff and the vehicle was driven by her son, 
Kris, on several occasions. (T. at 447-448) While Kris had the 
vehicle, the right front fender was damaged and had to be replaced, 
(T. at 269) and Kris hot-rodded the Blazer "a little bit" while 
rabbit hunting. (T. at 468-469) Also, there was damage to the 
Blazer's engine that is not associated with normal use. (T. at 336) 
Since the Plaintiff had the responsibility to account to the 
marital estate for assets left within her control she should be 
responsible to the marital estate for the damage to the Blazer. 
Defendant's testimony was uncontested that the decrease in value of 
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the vehicle was $2,000.00 from the time the parties separated until 
the time of trial. (T. at 582) 
The Plaintiff should be ordered to account to the marital 
estate for the decrease in value of the Blazer automobile. She 
should be ordered to accomplish this by either purchasing the asset 
from the marital estate for $3,500.00, its pre-separation value, 
or, upon sale of the vehicle, as ordered by the trial court, the 
Defendant should receive the first $1,750.00 of the sale proceeds, 
one-half its value from the date of separation, and the Plaintiff 
should be ordered to pay to the Defendant, out of her separate 
funds, a sufficient amount to reimburse Defendant for his interest 
in the Blazer automobile. 
4. The Plaintiff should be ordered to repay to the Defendant 
the full value of the loss of and damage to his fire arms which 
were left in her control and which were damaged by her minor son. 
If a party is responsible to account to the marital estate for 
dissipation of marital property, that party should, by the stronger 
reasoning, account to the other party for the dissipation of that 
party's separate and pre-marital asset. 
Following the parties' separation, the Plaintiff's minor son 
used the Defendant's fire-arms. (T. at 268) The firearms are 
Defendant's pre-marital property. (T. at 644) A shotgun valued at 
$375.00 was missing and Defendant testified that the damage to his 
other firearms after separation would require approximately 
$1,500.00 to repair. 
Since the Plaintiff had control and possession of the 
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Defendant's firearms during the pendency of the proceedings, she 
should be ordered to reimburse the Defendant the sum of $1,875,00 
out of her separate funds for the damage caused by Plaintiff's 
minor son to Defendant's firearms and for the missing shotgun. 
C. A CHILD SUPPORT ACCOUNT RECEIVABLE ACCUMULATED BY ONE 
PARTY DURING A MARRIAGE, ESPECIALLY WHERE THE OTHER PARTY TO THAT 
MARRIAGE HAS SUPPORTED THE CHILDREN OF THE SPOUSE IN WHOSE FAVOR 
THE RECEIVABLE HAS ACCRUED, IS AN ASSET WHICH, IN THE INTEREST OF 
EQUITY, SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE VALUE OF MARITAL ASSETS ALLOCATED 
TO THE CREDITOR SPOUSE. 
Plaintiff testified that in her divorce obtained prior to her 
marriage to the defendant, child support for her minor child, Kris, 
was awarded against Kris' father in the amount of $ 800.00 per 
month. [T. at 200] Kris resided with the Plaintiff and Defendant 
duriflg the marriage and was fully supported by them. (T. at 379) 
Child support payments totalling $150.00 were received from Kris' 
father, Plaintiff's ex-husband, during the parties' marriage, (T. 
at 381) leaving a receivable for the 80 1/2 months Plaintiff and 
Defendant resided together of $64,250.00. 
The issue before the Court is whether an accrued receivable 
for child support, acquired during the marriage and in favor of one 
party should be taken into account in allocating assets between the 
parties. Apparently, this is an issue of first impression in this 
state. However, accounts receivable are clearly assets which may 
be considered in the division of marital property. Sorenson v. 
SoreRSon, 839 P.2d 774, (Utah 1992). 
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Child support is a unique receivable in that it is accumulated 
in favor of one party for the benefit of a child. However, if the 
marital estate has provided the support for that child, then in 
equity, the marital estate ought to receive an interest in that 
receivable and be compensated if the receivable is ever liquidated. 
C.f. Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P. 2d 430 (Utah 1983). This is 
especially so in the context of a child support award which, in 
certain aspects, is a preferred debt as to which there are specific 
statutory provisions for collection, Utah Code Ann. §78-45-9, § 
62A-11-101 et al. In addition, at least in Utah, a child support 
obligation becomes a judgment on the date the support is due. (Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-3-106.) 
In this case, child support is a receivable which the 
Plaintiff has accumulated during the marriage. It is clearly an 
asset as to which a value should be assigned. However, the trial 
court refused to consider and assign a value to the claim for 
reimbursement for child support. In light of the preferred nature 
of that debt, value should have been assigned to that asset in the 
amount of $64,250.00. Not only is the asset one which should be 
included in the ultimate division of property, but it is an asset 
that should be considered a marital asset for purposes of property 
distribution, the parties having expended marital funds to 
accomplish the purpose for which the child support is intended: the 
support of the Plaintiff's minor son. 
In Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430, (Utah 1983), the Supreme 
Court classified that child support money in two categories, one, 
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the right of the child to receive support money from the non-
custodial parent, and two, the right to receive reimbursement for 
money expended to support the child. Id. Under the second 
category, the right to reimbursement belongs to the person or 
persons that furnished the support to the obligee child: 
[S]uppose a father (parent) fails over a 
period of time to furnish support of the 
child, and the mother, or someone else, 
furnishes it. That person then has the right 
to claim reimbursement from the parent, the 
same as any other past debt. This right of 
reimbursement belongs to whomever furnished 
the support; and it is subject to negotiation 
settlement, satisfaction or discharge in the 
same manner as any other debt. Id. 
Failure of the trial court to consider and value the claim for 
reimbursement of child support expended by the marital estate 
improperly excluded a tenable asset of the marital estate. 
D. BUSINESS DEBTS ACCUMULATED BY THE PARTIES' JOINTLY OWNED 
BUSINESS PRIOR TO THE SEPARATION SHOULD BE ASSESSED TO THE MARITAL 
ESTATE. 
The trial court's intent in this case was to effect an equal 
division of marital property. (T. at 737) One of the marriage's 
principal assets is the Sportsmen's Lounge in Cedar City, Utah. 
The Court ordered that the Lounge be sold and the proceeds divided 
equally between the parties. However, the Court departed from its 
intent to treat the Sportsmen's Lounge as an asset in which the 
parties had equal ownership and financial responsibility. This is 
so because the trial court assigned to the Defendant full 
responsibility for payment of the credit card debt accumulated 
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prior to the parties' marriage for travel expenses incurred during 
Defendant's commute from Cedar City to his place of employment by 
refusing to order the credit card debt paid by the Lounge. 
There is no justification in the record to support the Court's 
departure from its obvious intent with reference to treatment of 
the Sportsmen's Lounge and, accordingly, it was an abuse of the 
trial court's discretion to assign to the Defendant full 
responsibility for payment of that debt. 
This Court should order that, upon sale of the Sportsmen's 
Lounge, the credit card debt in the amount of $4,882.35 (T. at 592-
593) be paid out of the proceeds of sale. 
G. THE DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO PAY AN OBLIGATION ORDERED BY 
THE COURT WHILE WAITING FOR A HEARING AND RULING BY THE COURT WITH 
REFERENCE TO THAT OBLIGATION IS NOT CONTEMPT. 
On May 21, 1993, the Domestic Court Commissioner had ordered 
that the Defendant used the tax refund for payment of business 
debts associated with Sportsmen's Lounge. (Record at 42) The 
Defendant paid certain debts incurred in conjunction with operation 
of the Sportsmen's Lounge but held the balance during the pendency 
of the proceedings. (T. at 594) Defendant requested a ruling on 
his claim that the credit card debt for travel expenses is a 
business debt. The trial court did not rule on that issue at 
trial. Defendant filed a motion to supplement the findings. (T. at 
283) At the time of the hearing on that matter the trial court 
denied the motion and, instead, found the Defendant in contempt for 
failure to pay the proceeds as had been ordered by the Court 
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despite the Defendant's claim that the debt was a business debt and 
in light of the court's earlier order that the refund be used to 
pay business debts. 
UCA § 78-32-1 describes the acts that constitute contempt of 
court. Disobedience of a lawful order of the court may constitute 
contempt UCA § 78-32-1(5). However, in order to be guilty of 
contempt in a civil proceeding, the evidence must be clear and 
convincing that the Defendant 1) know what was required, 2) had the 
ability to comply, 3) intentionally failed or refused to do so. Von 
Hake v. Thomas, 759 P2d 1162 (Utah 1988). 
In this instance, the Defendant's conduct does not satisfy the 
elements for contempt. His failure to pay one-half the refund to 
Plaintiff was a result of his question as to what was required of 
him. On the one hand he had been ordered to use the money to pay 
business debts which should have included the pre-separation travel 
expense debt, and on the other hand he had been ordered to pay one-
half the money to Plaintiff. Until the confusion regarding 
classification of the travel expense debt as a business debt was 
clarified, Defendant did not know what was required of him. The 
sanction imposed of attorney's fees to Plaintiff's counsel should 
be lifted. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's treatment of premarital and marital assets 
ignored existing case law in this state and resulted in an 
inequitable division of property. This Court should enter an order 
that the home on South Fir Street is the premarital asset of the 
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Defendant and should order that he immediately be entitled to 
possession of same. In the alternative, in the event this Court 
were to determine that the home on South Fir Street is a marital 
asset, and that the same should be sold, the Court should order 
that the Defendant receive, out of the proceeds of sale and in 
recognition of his premarital contribution toward purchase of that 
asset, the $37,000.00 down payment plus the $5,000.00 spent to 
purchase the Jacuzzi and the reduction in principal on the first 
mortgage as his separate property with the balance of the net 
equity to be divided equally between the parties. 
The proceeds of the sale of the Jaguar automobile, which the 
Court has been ordered sold should be allocated between the parties 
in recognition of the Defendant's premarital interest in same. 
The Defendant should receive 20% of the net proceeds upon sale of 
that asset if the marital estate remains liable for the home equity 
loan or 70% if responsibility for payment of the home equity loan 
is assessed to Defendant, with the balance to be divided equally 
between the parties. 
The Plaintiff's Porsche automobile, a premarital asset of the 
Plaintiff, is an asset in which the marital estate has a 
substantial interest. Accordingly, in formulating its equal 
division of the marital estate, the Court should assign to the 
Plaintiff's portion of the marital estate the sum of $7,000.00 in 
recognition of her receiving the marital estate's full interest in 
that-asset. Other assets should be awarded to the Defendant to 
offset the marital portion of the automobile having been awarded to 
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the Plaintiff in full. 
Upon sale of the Sportsmen's Lounge the Plaintiff should be 
ordered to repay to the marital estate out of her share of the 
proceeds, the sum of $5,500.00 in recognition of her having taken 
that sum from the Sportsmen's Lounge in violation of the existing 
Court Order and using the same for her own benefit. 
The Blazer automobile should be awarded to Plaintiff or 
ordered sold and the Plaintiff ordered to pay Defendant one half of 
the vehicle's value at separation or supplement the proceeds of 
sale so that Defendant receives $1,750.00 upon sale of that asset, 
in recognition of Plaintiff's having allowed dissipation of that 
asset while it was under her control. 
The Plaintiff should be ordered to pay to the Defendant, out 
of her share of the proceeds of the sale of the Sportsmen's Lounge 
the amount of $1,875.00 to compensate the Defendant for the loss 
and damage caused to the Plaintiff's premarital property, his 
firearms, while the same were in the home and in the possession and 
control of the Plaintiff. 
The Defendant's salaried savings plan should have been valued 
as of the parties' separation in the amount of $72,513.19, and this 
Court should so order, awarding to the Plaintiff an interest in 
that salaried savings plan consistent with Woodward v. Woodward, 
656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982) and allow the Defendant the option of 
offsetting that value against his interest in the Sportsmen's 
Lounge or against other assets awarded to the Plaintiff. 
As her share of the marital estate, the Plaintiff should be 
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awarded the sum of $64,250.00 as an account receivable for child 
support accumulated during the marriage and the Defendant should be 
awarded other assets of the marriage sufficient to offset that 
award. 
Upon sale of the Sportsmen's Lounge, the outstanding credit 
card debt for travel expenses incurred prior to the parties' 
separation in the amount of $4,882.35 should be paid prior to 
allocating the net proceeds of sale to the parties. 
This Court should set aside the trial court's finding that 
Defendant was in contempt for failure to pay directly to the 
Plaintiff one-half of the income tax refund, in light of the 
legitimate question for which the Defendant sought a ruling 
concerning disposition of that asset and set aside the sanction 
imposed. 
DATED this day of , 1993 
G. Michael Westfall 
of and for 
GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LYNDA ANN SMITH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
RICHARD RAYMOND SMITH, SR. 
Defendant 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 924500057 
The above entitled matter came before the Court for trial on 
December 3, 4, and 10, 1992. The Plaintiff was present in person 
and represented by her counsel of record, Dale W. Sessions, of the 
law firm of CHAMBERLAIN S HIGBEE. The Defendant was present in 
person and represented by his counsel of record, G. Michael 
Westfall of the law firm of GALLIAN, WESTFALL & WILCOX. Witnesses 
were sworn and testified. Exhibits were marked and introduced into 
evidence. Upon consideration of the evidence presented, the Court 
hereby makes and enters the following: 
Findings S Conclusions 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Plaintiff has been an actual and bona fide resident of 
mty, State of Utah for three months immediately prior to 
mencement of this action. Defendant has consistently 
1 residency in the State of Utah during these proceedings 
Court finds Defendant is also a Utah resident. 
The parties were married on August 17, 1985 in Las Vegas, 
junty, Nevada, and since that time have been and now are 
and wife. 
Irreconcilable differences have arisen in the marriage 
It impossible for the parties to continue the marriage 
LShip. 
There have been no children born as issue of this marriage 
are expected; however, Plaintiff has custody of one child 
fe 18 from a prior marriage. That child will achieve his 
-thday during 1993. 
Alimony 
a. Financial conditions and needs of the receiving 
(plaintiff): The plaintiff claims in her Financial 
xe statement and the Court finds that she needs $605.00 per 
) satisfy her financial needs, plus housing costs. The 
mortgage on the home at 1098 South Fir Street is 
lately $450.00 per month, for a total monthly income need of 
0. Plaintiff will have no dependents in addition to 
when her son from a prior marriage reaches 18 in 1993. 
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Plaintiff is not able to do heavy lifting and wouldn't be able to 
work in a job that required that. However, that physical problem 
is not to the degree that she cannot ski or work. 
c. The ability of the responding spouse (defendants to 
provide support: The Defendant generates $5,551.00 per month gross 
earned income and has $5,086.00 monthly expenses. Defendant is 
capable of providing alimony to the Plaintiff in some amount with 
the difference. 
d. Additional Factors: The parties' had a short to moderate 
length marriage of seven (7) years, entered in mid-life when the 
parties' careers were established. Each party has maintained 
employment skills at oasically the same level they were at the time 
of the marriage. The Plaintiff was laid off, or gave up working as 
a clerk in an auto parts store in California in a minimum wage 
range of employment, and that is basically where she would reenter 
the work force now. There was a very general reference to modeling 
at a high wage rate, but credible evidence was not produced 
supporting that claim. This is in contrast to a case where the 
parties married young, one spouse put another through school, 
stayed home to raise children, divorced after a lengthy marriage, 
or terminated or refrained from entering an educational program at 
the request or insistence of the other spouse. 
Summary: While Defendant has the ability to pay some alimony, 
Plaintiff is able to support herself with her present lifestyle 
without it. Her monthly income shortfall of $250.00 ($805 income 
after the bar is sold less $1,055 expenses) will be more than 
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offset by the $95,000,00+ generated by the sale of assets. For 
example, it would only take a 3.16% annual return on investment on 
the $95,000.00 to generate $250/month to cover that difference 
without reducing principal. In addition to this amount, Plaintiff 
will soon receive proceeds from the sale of certain joint personal 
property ordered sold by this court, and a portion of Defendant's 
retirement and savings plan either in the future or in an earlier 
cash out. 
6. Plaintiff's accounts receivable for child support from a 
prior marriage are not an asset of the marriage and not something 
the court should distribute as part of this action. The Court 
finds those to be a premarital obligation of a prior husband and, 
as such, are not appropriate for the Court to distribute as an 
asset of the marriage in this case. 
7. Each party should assume and pay any debt incurred since 
their separation (which began during the first part of May 1992) 
except any debt incurred for the benefit of the Sportsmen Lounge, 
i.e repairs, pest control, remodeling etc. should be the joint 
responsibility of the parties. 
8. There are sufficient funds in this divorce to equalize the 
property distribution, so as far as premarital assets are 
concerned, the value is not important, it is moot. The premarital 
property of the Plaintiff should go back to the Plaintiff and the 
property of the Defendant should go back to the Defendant 
irrespective of the asset value. 
9. The following property is the Defendant's premarital 
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property and should not be divided in these proceedings but, 
instead, should be acknowledged as the Defendant's sole and 
separate premarital property: 
(a) Defendant's Air Force retirement which had fully 
vested prior to his marriage to Plaintiff. 
(b) The 1974 XKE Jaguar. 
(c) The 1977 XJS Jaguar. 
(d) Defendant's IRA account with the Lockheed Federal 
Credit Union. 
(e) Defendant's IRA account with the Langley Federal 
Credit Union. 
(f) The 1989 Sea Ray boat. 
(g) The following household furnishings and personal 
property: VCR, Microwave, coffee maker, blender, toaster, pots and 
pans, dishes with flowers, silver (12 piece setting), glass 
canisters (old English candy jar), Air Force collector's mugs, 
clothes dryer, clothes washer, refrigerator and freezer, couch 
(rust colored), rocking chair, love seat and two stools, kitchen 
table and four chairs, end table (2) coffee table, stereo 
equipment, tools in garage; picture (deer from son), family bible, 
books, afghan (made by Defendant's mother), 25" color TV, 14' 
aluminum bass boat, 2 other TV sets, antique guns, desk and chair, 
one water bed, movie camera, Teak wall unit, premarital personal 
items and clothing; fire arms and hunting equipment. 
(h) Defendant's premarital interest in the Lockheed 
Salaried Savings Plan (including the 401K) and the Lockheed 
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retirement program, the value of same to be calculated using the 
Woodward formula based on the value of said Salaried Savings Plan 
on December 10, 1992, and a present value for the Lockheed 
Retirement program, which will provide a monthly income flow of 
$490.29 to Defendant when he reaches the age of 65, approximately 
15 years from now of $8,755.19 by stipulation of the parties. 
10. The following items of personal property are found to be 
the premarital property of the Plaintiff and are acknowledged as 
such, free and clear of any claim by the Defendant to same: 
(a) 1982 Chevy Citation. 
(b) Custom waterbed, dresser, etc. 
(c) China cabinet. 
(d) 19" portable color TV. 
(e) 1969 Porsche automobile. 
11. Specifically, with reference to the Porsche automobile, 
the Court finds that the Porsche should be awarded to the Plaintiff 
as a premarital asset in total, although the Court finds that there 
were repairs made to the Porsche during the marriage. 
12. The Court finds as a general rule on these assets that 
assets and value of assets should be determined as of the time of 
the divorce according to Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695 (Utah 
1985). The Court finds the following items of property to be 
marital property and finds the values as indicated and that the 
property should be awarded as indicated: 
To Defendant: 
(a) The 1979 Corvette, has a value of $3,000.00 and 
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should be awarded to the Defendant. 
(b) The 46" color TV has a value of $950.00 and should 
be awarded to the Defendant. That finding of value was arrived at 
by taking the average of Plaintiff's opinion that the value of that 
item is $1,300.00 and Defendant' opinion that it is worth $600.00. 
(c) The 30.6 rifle should be awarded to the Defendant. 
The value is $225.00. 
(d) The outdoor furniture should be awarded to the 
Defendant. The value of the outdoor furniture is $100.00. 
(e) The butcher's blocks with knife sets are found to be 
worth $40.00 each. One of them should be awarded to the Defendant. 
(f) The couch/pull-out bed, valued at $75.00 should be 
awarded to Defendant. 
To Plaintiff: 
(g) The 1982 Ford pickup should be awarded to the 
Plaintiff. The Court finds that the Ford pickup has a value of 
$2,400.00. This finding was arrived at by averaging Plaintiff's 
opinion that the value of the pickup truck is $3,000.00 and 
Defendant's opinion that it is worth $1,800.00. 
(h) The soda cooler should be awarded to^  the Plaintiff. 
The Court finds that the soda cooler has a value of $180.00. That 
finding was arrived at by averaging Plaintiff's opinion that the 
value of that item of property is $300.00 and Defendant's opinion 
that it is worth $65.00. 
(i) The lawn mower should be awarded to the Plaintiff. 
The Court finds its value to be $100.00. 
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(j) The willow furniture should be awarded to the 
Plaintiff• The Court finds the value, of the willow furniture to be 
$275.00. That finding is based on an average of Plaintiff's 
opinion that the value of the willow furniture is $450.00 and 
Defendant's opinion that it is worth $100.00. 
(k) The duck pictures should be awarded to the 
Defendant. The Court finds the value to be $100.00, based in part 
on Plaintiff's claim that the purchase price was $25.00. 
(1) The dome clock should be awarded to the Plaintiff. 
The Court finds *the value of the dome clock to be $55.00. That 
finding is based on an average of Plaintiff's opinion that the 
value of the dome, clock is $35.00 and Defendant's opinion that the 
value is $75.00. 
(m) The plants should be awarded to the Plaintiff. The 
Court finds the value of the plants to be $350.00. That finding is 
based on an average of Plaintiff's opinion that the value of the 
plants is $200.00 and Defendant's opinion that the value is 
$500.00. 
(n) One of the butcher's blocks with knife set should be 
awarded to the Plaintiff with a value of $40.00. 
(o) The kitchen wall decorations should be awarded to 
the Plaintiff. The Court finds the value of the kitchen wall 
decorations to be $30.00. That finding is based on an average of 
Plaintiff's opinion that the value of the kitchen wall decoration 
is $20.00 and Defendant's opinion that the value is $40.00. 
(p) The blue plates should be awarded to the Plaintiff. 
Findings & Conclusions Q 
The Court finds the value of the blue plates to be $75.00• 
(q) The afghans, other than the one made by the 
Defendant's mother, should be awarded to the Plaintiff. The Court 
finds the value of these afghans to be $150.00. 
(r)^ The couch, chair, foot stool (earth tones) should be 
awarded to the Plaintiff. They have a value of $150.00. 
The Court finds by totalling the values of the assets 
distributed in the preceding paragraph, approximately $4,200.00 is 
being given to Defendant and approximately $3,600.00 is being given 
to Plaintiff. The Court finds that the extra $600.00 more awarded 
to Defendant is for an offset for the loss of Defendant's property 
from the Blazer which was supposed to be left at the airport for 
his use. The Court finds the distribution set out thus far is, 
therefore, equalized. 
13. The Sportsmen's Lounge~was purchased for $190,000.00 with 
an approximate $60,000.00 down payment. It needs repair. The 
lounge lost money for a period of time. Recently, it has been 
operating in the black. The Court finds the Sportsmen's Lounge is 
a marital asset. Both parties want the Sportsmen's Lounge sold. 
It should be sold together with the real property owned by the 
parties in conjunction with the business and all assets of the 
business and the proceeds divided equally between the parties, or 
offset against other assets, with all encumbrances, including 
mortgages, and costs of sale to be paid prior to distribution or 
allocating of the sale proceeds. The parties should take 
commercially reasonable steps to affect sale of the Sportsmen's 
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Lounge. 
The Court finds Plaintiff is operating the bar in the black 
and she should be allowed to continue to operate the business as 
the manager and to draw from this point forward, $1,000.00 per 
month as she has done since mid-August, 1992. The Court finds that 
Plaintiff does work at the Sportsmen's Lounge and is entitled to 
receive reimbursement for that work. 
Additionally, the Court finds that it is not feasible to hire 
a third party to act as manager based on the testimony of the 
auditor, Worth Grimshaw, C.P.A. 
14. The Court finds that the Defendant does not have a 
premarital interest in the marital residence at 1098 South Fir 
Street or in the Sportsmen's Lounge. Although Defendant 
unilaterally placed his name on the Cedar City home, the Court 
finds that the property was purchased during the time of the 
marriage, each party lived in the home, the Plaintiff continuously 
and the Defendant on weekends, and all of the real property 
purchased in Cedar City should be treated as marital property. To 
treat the Plaintiff's $100,000.00 California home sale proceeds as 
co-mingled assets and turn around and treat the Defendant's 
$46,000.00 California home sale proceeds as separate property may 
be what the Defendant alone planned, but would not be equitable and 
isn't justified under the evidence as viewed by the Court. No 
signed waiver of interest relative to the Cedar City home has been 
produced. But, even with the asset being just in his name, the 
Court finds that each party owned a premarital home and each party 
Findings & Conclusions ] ^ 
3L6} 
received proceeds from the sale of their premarital home after this 
marriage, Plaintiff in the amount of $100,000.00 in October of 1990 
and Defendant in the amount of $46,000.00 in 1988. 
The assets (proceeds) were co-mingled. Each party shared in 
the use of the proceeds and, in fact, the Plaintiff testified her 
$100,000.00 went into an account with only his (Defendant's) name 
on it. The Court finds the assets were thereby co-mingled. 
15. Both parties claim a strong interest and apparently do 
have a strong interest in the home. However, both seem to have an 
aversion to it. The Plaintiff spends time away from the home and 
the Defendant lives and works in a different state. The court 
finds that the home at 1098 South Fir Street, together with the 
Jacuzzi, bar and bar stools, and the Sportsmen's Lounge should be 
treated as marital property and should be sold and the proceeds 
divided equally between the parties or offset against other assets 
as set forth hereinafter, with all encumbrances, including 
mortgages and the home equity loan, and costs of sale to be paid 
prior to distribution or allocation of the sale proceeds. The 
parties are to take commercially reasonable steps to affect sale of 
the home and Sportsmen's Lounge. 
16. Pending sale the Plaintiff should be awarded possession 
and management of the Sportsmen's Lounge and should be allowed to 
continue to pay herself a salary of $1,000.00 per month. 
17. Plaintiff should be awarded possession of the home at 
1098 South Fir Street pending sale and should be responsible to pay 
the first mortgage on the home. The Defendant should make the 
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house payment through December, 1992. Beginning January 1, 1993, 
the Plaintiff should make the first mortgage payment on the home. 
The Defendant should be ordered to provide the Plaintiff with the 
address where payments are made and to make arrangements so that 
the payments can be made by the Plaintiff on the first mortgage. 
The Defendant should be responsible to pay the monthly payments as 
they come due on the home equity loan secured by the home at 1098 
South Fir Street. 
18. The Zourt finds that all assets, including the 
Defendant's Salaried Savings Plan should be valued as of December 
10, 1992. The value of the Salaried Savings Plan should be 
established by a statement similar to Exhibit " 39" prepared by the 
persons administrating the Salaried Savings Plan, reserving to the 
Court jurisdiction to set the value in the event there is a dispute 
between the parties. 
19. The Defendant should be allowed to either pay to the 
Plaintiff one-half the value of the marital share of the Salaried 
Savings Plan, and the Lockheed retirement Program, calculated 
consistent with the Woodward decision or the Defendant may elect to 
allow Plaintiff to keep a portion of Defendant's share of the 
proceeds of sale of the home and lounge equal to the Plaintiff's 
interest in the 401K salary savings plan based on the Woodward 
formula and the value of the Salaried Savings Plan and the Lockheed 
Retirement Program. 
20. Defendant is holding, in his checking account, $2,550.12 
of the parties' income tax refund for 1991. Of this refund amount, 
Findings & Conclusions ^3 
Defendant should be ordered to pay the outstanding bill for repair 
presently due and payable to Sillitoe Repair Shop in the amount of 
$126,56, the amount due and owing to Marjorie Young and the balance 
should be divided equally between the parties. 
21. The Court finds that the following items of personal 
property should be sold and the proceeds divided equally between 
the parties: 
(a) A 1977 Swinger motor home. The Court finds that this 
item of property, was acquired during the marriage and is marital 
property. 
(b) The 1988 Jaguar automobile. This item was acquired 
•during the marriage and the Court finds it to be a marital asset. 
Because the parties' testimony as to value is too far apart, the 
Court find that it may not be fair to average the parties' 
respective opinions as to the value of this item and the Court 
therefore orders that the 1988 Jaguar be sold and the proceeds 
divided equally between the parties. 
(c) The Piper Arrow airplane should be sold and the 
proceeds of sale divided equally between the parties. 
(d) The 1980 Blazer automobile should be sold and the 
proceeds distributed equally between the parties. 
22. The Court finds that there is reason and grounds for 
issuing a permanent injunction. Potentially, there may be a 
problem between the parties since they inevitably have to get 
together at real estate closings during property division, etc. 
The Court finds Defendant physically and verbally abused Plaintiff 
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and even displayed a lack of temper control in Court. A permanent 
injunction restraining Defendant from any contact with Plaintiff 
should be ordered. 
23. The Defendant should be allowed to retrieve his personal 
property, household goods and furnishings from the home at 1098 
South Fir Street on December 28, 29, and 30, 1992, in the presence 
of a neutral third party. If Mrs. Marjorie Young is the third 
party present at that time, then the parties should pay to her out 
of the tax refund money held by the Defendant a fair hourly rate in 
the $5.00 to $10.00 per hour range, to be negotiated directly with 
Mrs. Young. If there is a dispute between the parties concerning 
any item of personal property which Defendant claims is his, the 
Court should reserve jurisdiction to resolve that dispute. 
24. Each party will have sufficient assets with each to pay 
his or her own costs and expenses, including attorney's fees. 
Therefore, no attorney's fees should be awarded to either party. 
25. Plaintiff should be restored to her maiden name of Lynda 
Ann Nehen. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes and 
enters the following Conclusions of Law: 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject 
matter of this lawsuit. 
2. Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from the 
Defendant on the grounds of irreconcilable differences the same to 
become final and effective immediately upon signature and entry. 
3. No alimony should be awarded to either party. 
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4. Plaintiff should not be ordered to repay Defendant for 
alimony paid during the time she has been drawing a salary from the 
Sportsmen's Lounge. 
5. Each party should be awarded his or her premarital 
property as set forth hereinabove. 
6. Marital property should be awarded to the parties as set 
forth hereinabove. 
7.".Those items of marital property identified in the Findings 
of Fact should be sold and the proceeds divided equally between the 
parties. However, the Defendant should have the option of trading 
a portion of his share in the proceeds of sale of the home and 
Sportsmen's Lounge for the Plaintiff's interest in the retirement 
and his Salaried Savings Plan and Lockheed Retirement Program. 
'8. Defendant should be allowed to retrieve his property from 
the home at 1098 South Fir Street in Cedar City, Utah, as set forth 
above. 
9. The Defendant should be restrained from any contact with 
the Plaintiff except in the presence of a neutral third party or 
counsel. 
10. The Court finds as a general rule on these assets that 
assets and value of assets should be determined as of the time of 
the divorce according to Berger, 713, P.2d 695. 
11. Plaintiff should be restored to her former name of Lynda 
Ann Nehen. 
12. Each party should pay his or her own costs and attorney's 
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fees incurred herein. [/V"*^" 
DATED this I day of /5?i 
BY THE COURT: 
./ 1993, 
Robert T. Braithwaite 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
DALE W. SESSIONS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Addendum Item Number 2 
% 
GALLIAN, WESTFALL & WILCOX 
G. Michael Westfall #3434 
Attorney for Defendant 
ONE SOUTH MAIN STREET 
DIXIE STATE BANK BUILDING 
P. 0. Box 367 
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770 
(801) 628-1682 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LYNDA SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD RAYMOND SMITH, SR., 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 924500057 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court for trial on 
December 3, 4 and 10, 1992. The Plaintiff was present in person and 
represented by her counsel of record, Dale W. Sessions, of the law 
firm of CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE. The Defendant was present in person 
and represented by his counsel of record, G. Michael Westfall of 
the law firm of GALLIAN & WESTFALL. Witnesses were sworn and 
testified. Exhibits were marked and introduced into evidence. 
Upon consideration of the evidence presented, the Court made 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Based thereon the Court 
now ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: 
^ 
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1. The Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce from the 
Defendant on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, the same to 
become final and effective immediately upon signature and entry. 
2. No alimony is awarded to the Plaintiff. 
3. Each party shall assume and pay any individual debts 
incurred since their separation during the first part of May, 1992, 
except any debt incurred for the benefit of the Sportsman's Lounge, 
i.e., repairs, pest control, remodeling, etc., should be the joint 
responsibility of the parties. 
4. The following property is the Defendant's pre-marital 
property and is not divided in these proceedings but, instead, is 
acknowledged as the Defendant's sole and separate pre-marital 
property: 
(a). Defendant's Air Force retirement which had fully 
vested prior to his marriage to Plaintiff. 
(b). The 1974 XKE Jaguar. 
(c). The 1977 XJS Jaguar. 
(d). The Defendant's IRA account with the Lockheed 
Federal Credit Union. 
(e). The Defendant's IRA account with the Langley Federal 
Credit Union. 
(f). The 1989 Sea Ray boat. 
(g). The following household furnishings and personal 
property: VCR, Microwave, coffee maker, blender, 
toaster, pots and pans, dishes with flowers, silver 
(12 piece setting), glass cannisters (old english 
candy jars), Air Force collector's mugs, clothes 
6. The Court awards the following items of marital property as 
indicated free and clear of any claim by the other party to same. 
A. To the Defendant: 
.(1). The 1979 Corvette. 
(2). The 46" color TV. 
(3). The 30.6 rifle. 
(4) . The outdoor furniture. 
(5). One butcher's block with knife set. 
(6)-. The couch/pull-out bed. 
B. To the Plaintiff: 
(1). The 1982 Ford pickup. 
(2) .' The soda cooler. 
(3) . The lawn mower. 
(4) . The willow furniture. 
(5) . The duck pictures. 
(6).. The dome clock 
(7). The plants 
(8). One of the butcher's blocks with knife set. 
(9). The kitchen wall decorations 
(10). The blue plates 
(11). The afghans, other than the one made by the 
Defendant's mother 
(12) . The couch, chair, foot stool (earth tones) 
7. The home at 1098 South Fir Street, together with the 
Jacuzzi, bar and bar stools, and the Sportsmen's Lounge, together 
with the real estate owned by the parties in conjunction with that 
business and all assets of the business, shall be sold and the 
proceeds divided equally between the parties or offset against other 
assets as set forth hereinafter, with all encumbrances, including 
mortgages and the home equity loan, and costs of sale to be paid 
prior to distribution or allocation of the sale proceeds. The 
parties are to take commercially reasonable steps to affect sale of 
the home and Sportsmen's Lounge, 
8. Pending sale the Plaintiff is awarded possession and 
management of the Sportsmen's Lounge and is allowed to continue to 
pay herself a salary of $1,000.00 per month. 
9. Plaintiff is awarded possession of the home at 1098 South 
Fir Street pending sale and is responsible to pay the first mortgage 
on the home. The Defendant shall make the house payment through 
December, 1992. Beginning January 1, 199 3, the Plaintiff shall make 
the first mortgage payment on the home. The Defendant is ordered to 
provide the Plaintiff with the address where payments are made and 
to make arrangements so that the payments can be made by the 
Plaintiff on that first mortgage. The Defendant shall pay the 
monthly payments as they come due on the home equity loan secured by 
the home at 109 8 South Fir Street. 
10. The value of the Salaried Savings Plan on December 10, 
1992, shall be established by a statement similar to Exhibit M39" 
prepared by the persons administrating the Salaried Savings Plan, 
reserving to the Court jurisdiction to set the value in the event 
there is a dispute between the parties. 
11. The Defendant may either pay to the Plaintiff one-half the 
value of the marital share of the Salaried Savings Plan and the 
Lockheed Retirement Program, calculated consistent with the Woodward 
decision, or the Defendant may elect to allow Plaintiff to keep a 
portion of Defendant's share of the proceeds of sale of the home and 
lounge equal to the Plaintiff's interest in the Salaried Savings 
Plan. 
12. Defendant is ordered to pay the outstanding bill for 
repair of the 1980 Blazer automobile due and payable to Sillitoe 
Repair—Shop in the amount of $126.56 and the amount due and owing 
Marjorie Young .out of the $2,550.12 remaining of the tax refund 
which is held by Defendant in his checking account. The balance of 
that refund should be divided equally between the parties. 
13. The following items of personal property shall be sold and 
the proceeds divided equally between the parties: 
(1). A 1977 Swinger motor home. 
(2). The 1988 Jaguar automobile. 
(3). The Piper Arrow Airplane. 
(4) . The 1980 Blazer automobile. 
14. Defendant is permanently enjoined from any contact with 
the Plaintiff except by prior arrangement in the presence of a 
neutral third party agreeable to both parties. 
15. Plaintiff is ordered to allow Defendant to retrieve his 
personal property, household goods and furnishings from the home at 
1098 South Fir Street on December 28, 29 and 30, 1992, in the 
presence of a neutral third party. If Mrs. Marjorie Young is the 
third party present at that time, then the parties should pay to her 
out of the tax refund money held by the Defendant a fair hourly rate 
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in the $5.00 to $10.00 per hour range, to be negotiated directly 
with Mrs. Young. If there is a dispute between the parties 
concerning any item of personal property which Defendant claims is 
his, the Court reserves jurisdiction to resolve that dispute. 
16. Each party shall pay his or her own costs and attorney's 
fees. 
17. Plaintiff is restored to her maiden name of Lynda Ann 
Nehen. 
Ffy day of fs&L DATED t h i s , / / /   M/PJUAM}^ , 1993. 
BY THE (WURT: 
^t^m^r 2 
Robert T. Braithwaite 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
AND CONTENT: 
Dale W. Sessions 
MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT 
FINDINGS AND ORDER 
Addendum Item Number 3 
GALLIAN & WESTFALL 
G. MICHAEL WESTFALL #3434 
Attorney for Defendant 
ONE SOUTH MAIN STREET 
DIXIE STATE BANK BUILDING 
P.O. Box 367 
St. George, Utah 84770 
(801) 628-1682 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LYNDA SMITH, 
Plaintiff ; 
v s . 
RICHARD RAYMOND, SMITH, SR. j 
Defendant ; 
I MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT 
I FINDINGS AND ORDER 
C i v i l No. 924500057 
Defendant, by and through his attorney, G. Michael Westfall of 
the law firm of GALLIAN & WESTFALL, hereby requests that the Court 
supplement its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order, 
as announced on December 10, 1992, as follows: 
1. Defendant requests that the Court enter a finding 
acknowledging as the Defendant's premarital property, all 
furnishings and premarital property he brought into the marriage, 
including, but not limited to, the teak table, and teak sideboard, 
piano, and the Defendant's jewelry which was in the Defendant's 
jewelry box and left by the Defendant in the Blazer the last time 
he parked the Blazer at the airport in May, 1992. 
2. Defendant moves the Court to supplement its Findings and 
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Order to find that approximately $1,300.00 worth of jewelry was 
removed from the Defendant's jewelry box left by Defendant in the 
Blazer automobile at the airport in May, 1992, and that either the 
Plaintiff or her son removed the Blazer automobile, containing the 
jewelry box, from the airport, despite the fact that the Blazer was 
to have been left there for the Defendant's use. The Court should 
also find that the Defendant found the jewelry box, together with 
a portion of its contents, in the home at 1098 South Fir Street, 
during one of his visits there. The Defendant further moves the 
Court for entry of a legal conclusion that Plaintiff is responsible 
for the loss of that property from the jewelry box and entry of an 
Order that the Plaintiff reimburse the Defendant the sum of 
$1,300.00 for the loss of his jewelry from the jewelry box. 
3. Defendant moves the Court for an entry of a finding that 
the Plaintiff's son has damaged the Defendant's firearms since the 
parties have separated and while the firearms were in the 
Plaintiff's possession, and that the cost to restore those firearms 
is $1,500.00. Defendant further requests that the Court enter a 
legal conclusion that Plaintiff is responsible for the damage to 
the firearms and entry of an Order requiring that the Plaintiff 
reimburse the Defendant in that amount for damage to his firearms. 
4. Defendant moves the Court for entry of an Order finding 
that the Plaintiff should repay to the Defendant the sum of 
$1,500.00 as approximately one-half of the approximately $3,000.00 
which the Plaintiff claims was stolen from the home at 1098 South 
Fir Street, on or about the 8th day of June, 1992. 
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5. Defendant further moves the Court for entry of a finding 
that when the Defendant's premarital home was sold the proceeds 
were used to pay the down payment on the home at 1098 South Fir 
Street, to purchase the Jacuzzi, and to pay the parties' moving 
expenses and all of the mortgage payments on the home at 1098 South 
Fir Street have been paid with the Defendant's premarital Air Force 
retirement. 
6. Defendant further moves the Court for entry of a finding 
that the VISA credit card debt incurred to pay travel expenses, 
including fuel for the airplane, at least prior to the parties' 
separation, is a debt of the Sportsmen's Lounge and should be paid 
by income generated from the Lounge and/or the proceeds of sale of 
the Lounge before the proceeds of sale are divided between the 
parties and also moves the Court for entry of an order requiring 
Plaintiff to reimburse Defendant one-half of the First Security 
cash reserve debt which had been paid by Defendant since these 
proceedings were initiated. 
7. Defendant further moves the Court for entry of an order 
requiring that the Plaintiff return to the Defendant or allow the 
Defendant to retrieve the following items of personal property some 
of 'which the Plaintiff refused to allow Defendant to take with him 
on December 29th, and some of which the Defendant was unable to 
remove from the premises at that time: 
(1) Coffee maker, 
(2) Blender, 
(3) Toaster , 
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(4) Pots and pans, 
(5) Refrigerator, 
(6) Freezer, 
(7) 25" color TV, 
(8) Waterbed, 
(9) Movie camera (Camcorder) 
(10) Vacuum cleaner, 
(11) One-half of the towels, linens, bedding, pillows, 
blankets, etc. 
(12) Washer and dryer, 
(13) Ironing board and iron, 
(14) Aluminum boat, 
(15) Ski boat and trailer, 
(16) V12 engine, 
(17) 870 shot gun, 
(18) Gun cleaning kits, 
(19) Hunting clothes, gloves, hats, etc. 
(20) Ski jacket, scarfs, etc. 
DATED this /^ ~ day of ( tifou^ ,1993. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copv of the 
foregoing document, postage prepaid, this Jd^ day of CVn^7 / 
1993, to the following: *  (J 
Dale Sessions, Esq. 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
250 South Main 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
\UuLA^.^) HQJ\i 
Secretary 
CERTIFICATE OF TRANSMISSION BY FACSIMILIE 
I hereby certify that I sent by facsimilie a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document, postage prepaid, this 13*^ day 
of Q&s+J , 1993, to the following: 
2 Dale Sessions, Esq. 
FAX NO: 586-1002 
<7\ M ^ u v ^ yL]&-h city 
Secretary 
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DALE W. SESSIONS [5793] ~ J 
CHAMBERLAIN & fflGBEE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
250 South Main 
P.O. Box 726 
Cedar City, UT 84721-0726 
(801) 586-4404 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LYNDA ANN SMITH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
V S . J 
RICHARD RAYMOND SMITH, SR., ] 
Defendants. ] 
I O R D E R 
1 Civil No. 924500057DA 
) Judge Robert T. Braithwaite 
This matter came on regularly for hearing on various post-judgment motions filed by both 
counsel on Thursday, February 25, 1993 at 1:30 p.m. with the Honorable Robert T. Braithwaite 
presiding. Plaintiff was present and was represented by counsel, Dale W. Sessions of 
Chamberlain & Higbee. Defendant was present and was represented by G. Michael Westfall 
of Gallian, Westfall & Wilcox. The Court, having reviewed the file, having heard the testimony 
and being fully advised in the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Motions to Settle Final Documents and/or Adopt Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law filed by both counsel are now moot based on the Court's earlier rulings. 
2. With respect to Plaintiffs Motion to Settle Final Documents and Clarify Terms 
and Conditions the Court orders as follows: 
(a) Regarding Paragraph 1, Defendant is to pick up any personal property items 
remaining in Plaintiffs possession on March 13 and 14, 1993. Defendant is to be permitted 
access to the marital residence between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. During the times 
Defendant is to be in the residence, a police officer will be present. If Defendant is to be 
detained or late, a courtesy call to the police informing them of such is to be made by 
Defendant. Mr. Westfall is to make arrangements with the Police Department to comply with 
this Order. 
(b) Regarding Paragraph 2, the relief requested is moot because the Findings of Fact 
and the Conclusions of Law have been adopted by the Court, 
(c) Regarding Paragraph 3, the Court reserves the issue of the proceeds from the 
VFW building, the Court takes that issue under advisement. 
As to the issues of termites in the Bar, the Court orders that Plaintiffs attorney contact 
the person at Alpine Pest Control who is in charge of termite eradication requesting him to write 
a letter to the Court [Judge Braithwaite] setting out his recommendations and send a copy of that 
letter to both attorneys. The treatment for the termite infestation is to be carried out according 
to the recommendation of Alpine Pest Control subject to further order of the Court. Fifteen 
days after the letter from Alpine Pest Control is mailed to the Court, either side can produce a 
bid for less expensive service. 
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As to the issue of property taxes, the Court takes no action on the tax issue at this time 
because the property is not under threat of tax sale. 
3. Defendant's Motion to Supplement Findings and Order. The Court orders as 
follows: 
(a) The Court orders that the teak table, teak sideboard, piano and jewelry which have 
been picked up by the Defendant are to be the Defendant's property. 
(b) Regarding Paragraph 2 of Defendant's Motion, the disposition of this paragraph 
is addressed in Findings and Decree. 
(c) Regarding Paragraph 3 of Defendant's Motion, the Court denies the relief 
requested. 
(d) Regarding Paragraph 4 of Defendant's Motion, the Court denies the relief 
requested on the basis that both parties have been harmed equally. 
(e) Regarding Paragraph 5 of Defendant's Motion, by way of clarification, the Court 
has previously entered findings that proceeds were commingled. Since this issue has already 
been addressed in the Findings, Conclusions and Decree, it will not be addressed further. 
(f) Regarding Paragraph 6 of Defendant's Motion, the Court denies the relief 
requested. 
(g) Regarding Paragraph 7 of Defendant's Motion, Defendant is ordered to retrieve 
the following items from Plaintiffs residence on March 13 and 14, 1993 as set out previously 
herein, to wit: Coffee maker, blender, toaster, pots and pans, refrigerator, freezer, 25" color 
TV, waterbed, camcorder, washer and dryer, one (1) vacuum cleaner, aluminum boat, V-12 
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engine, ski boat and trailer, gun cleaning kits, hunting clothes, gloves, hats, etc., and ski jacket, 
scarfs, etc., and the 870 shotgun, if/when it is located. What linens, towels, etc. Defendant has 
in his possession on February 25, 1993 are to remain in his possession. 
4. Defendant's Motion for Rehearing on Issue of Temporary Restraining Order and 
Disposition of Airplane: 
(a) Regarding Paragraph 1 of Defendant's Motion, the Court denies the relief 
requested in Paragraph 1. 
(b) Regarding Paragraph 2 of Defendant's Motion, the Court orders a 60-day cutoff 
for the sale of the airplane. The airplane is to be sold to highest bidder either, found by Plaintiff 
or Defendant. If there is a profit, the parties will share in the profit. If it is sold at a loss, the 
parties will share in the loss. The Court orders Defendant to pay the hangar costs, and that 
hanger costs from December 10, 1992 forward are to be shared equally upon sale, as will 
insurance costs. 
5. Plaintiffs Motion for Contempt and Order to Show Cause: 
(a) Regarding Paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs Motion, the Court hereby orders that the 
bank or credit union (Lockheed) provide copies of the account status and whatever financial 
information they have on this account for the months of November, 1992, December, 1992 and 
January, 1993, and to provide such to both Plaintiff and Defendant at their respective residences. 
Either Plaintiff or Defendant can bring those issues back before the Court. 
(b) Because Defendant has made no payment of Plaintiffs portion of the 1991 IRS 
refund, the Court finds Defendant in contempt. Rather than impose jail time or a fine, the Court 
hereby orders Defendant to pay Plaintiffs attorneys fees for the entire proceedings of this date. 
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The Court limits the amount of attorney fees to a reasonable amount and Plaintiffs counsel, Mr. 
Sessions, is ordered to prepare what he claims for preparation for the proceedings on February 
25, 1993 with a copy of his summary submitted to the Court and to Defendant's attorney. If 
necessary, further hearing will be held, 
(c) Since Defendant did not pay Mr. Sillitoe as previously ordered and did not pay 
Mrs. Young, he is ordered to pay $40.00 to Plaintiff as reimbursement for Mrs. Young's 
expenses and $63.49, which is one-half the amount of the Sillitoe bill which has been paid by 
Plaintiff. 
(d) Defendant is ordered to pay $20.15 to Plaintiff for long-distance telephone calls 
made and charged to Plaintiffs telephone bill. 
(e) Defendant is ordered to take every effort to obtain the retirement computations 
to compute Plaintiffs portion. Defendant is ordered to provide the information to the Court on 
or before May 1, 1993. If an amount is not obtained by that date, the Court may arbitrarily set 
an amount. 
(0 The Court orders that all personal property items that were ordered sold in the 
Decree are to be sold on or before May 1, 1993 and the proceeds divided. If the items have not 
been sold at that time, the Court may order reverse possession. The Court intends that this 
would mean taking everything that Defendant has in his possession that needs to be sold and give 
it to Plaintiff to sell and everything Plaintiff has in her possession that needs to be sold will be 
given to Defendant to sell. If that is not accomplished after 60 days, the Court may enter 
further orders. 
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(g) As to the Sportsman's Lounge and home, the Court orders no further real estate 
listing to be made without Court approval. The parties may submit an application for listing buy 
stipulation. 
DATED this S?l day of March, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
'T^dBRiATrir^jArrE 
District Court Judge 
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IN THE FIFTH'JUDICIAL"'DISTRICT COURT 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SMITH, LYNDA ANN 
VS 
PLAINTIFF 
SMITH, RICHARD RAYMOND,SR; 
DEFENDANT, 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 924500057 DA 
DATE 05/21/92 
HONORABLE ROBERT T BRAITHWAITE
 V V 
COURT REPORTER 1-5-99 (3533-END)'**-\
v 
COURT CLERK KDP 
v 
TYPE OF HEARING: ORDER TO .-.SHOW CAUSE 
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT 
P. ATTY. SE§SJLQNS-^ _DALE__W___^  
D. ATTYw^WESTFALL, G MICHAEL" 
\T 
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FOLLOWING ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL PARTIES STIPULATE THAT THE 
MUTUAL RESTRAINING ORDER REMAIN IN EFFECT DURING THE PENDENCY 
OF THESE PROCEEDINGS. 1)PLAINTIFF IS TO REMAIN IN THE MARITAL 
HOME WITH TEMPORARY SUPPORT OF $1,000 A MONTH. 2)THE DEFENDANT I 
TO HAVE ACCESS TO THE ACCOUNTING AND INVENTORY RECORDS OF THE 
BUSINESS THRU THE ACCOUNTANT. IF A QUESTIONS ARISES HE CAN 
PETITION THE COURT AT ANY TIME FOR A CHANGE IN THE ARRANGEMENT. 
3)A THIRD PARTY CAN MONITOR THE BUSINESS ON BANDNIGHT AND REPORT 
TO THE DEFENDANT. 4)BOTH PARTIES ARE RESTRAINED FROM DISPOSING, 
WASTING, OR HARMING MARITIAL AND PREMARITAL ASSETS PENDING 
FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT." 5)DEFENDANT TO HAVE ACCESS TO THE 
HOME TO OBTAIN DOCUMENTS IN THE COMPANY OF AN OFFICER. 6) MR. 
SMITH IS TO HAVE THE USE OF THE JAGUARS DURING THE PENDENCY 
OF THESE PROCEEDINGS. 7)MRS. SMITH IS TO DRAW NO FUNDS FROM THE 
BUSINESS. THEY ARE TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR IN FULL. 8)THE PARITIES 
INCOME TAX REFUND IS TO BE USED FOR BUSINESS EXPENSES. 9)COURT 
RESERVED RULING ON ISSUE OF ATTORNEYS FEES. MR. SESSIONS WILL 
PREPARE THE ORDER. 
*** 
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